이 신문은 국제면 한면을 할애한 비무장지대(DMZ) 르포 기사에서 "만일 외교가 실패한다면 북한군 병력은 휴전선을 넘어 기습적이고 맹렬한 공격을 감행할 수도 있는 것으로 미군 관계자들은 예상했다"면서 "그 목표는 증원군이 도착하고 북한의 경제적인 약점이 군대에 영향을 주는 시점인 30일 이내에 한국군과 미군을 패배시키는것"이라고 말했다.

그러나 이 신문은 북한이 경제적 어려움으로 훈련횟수나 훈련 장비가 점점 줄어들고 있다는 리언 라포트 한미연합사령관의 말을 전했다. 라포트 사령관은 서면 인터뷰에서 "(북한군의) 훈련은 대부분 주둔지나 그 근처에서 실시되며 소규모의 장비와 인력만이 참가한다"면서 "훈련은 기본적인 (전투) 능력 향상에 초점을 맞추고 있다"고 말했다. 라포트 사령관은 또 북한군의 기갑부대와 항공기들도 노후화됐다면서"북한 정권은 낡은 재래식 병력을 현대화할 능력이 없었다"고 말했다.

이 신문은 미국 국방부가 110억 달러를 들여 앞으로 4년 동안 한국 및 주변 지역에 아파치 공격 헬리콥터 신모델을 공급하고 패트리어트 요격미사일 시스템을 구축하는 한편 이라크에서 사용된 것같은 정밀유도 무기들을 배치할 것이라고 보도했다.

이 신문은 이미 미국이 새 컴퓨터 네트워크를 배치했으며 이것은 지휘관들이 미군과 한국군 간의 움직임을 더 잘 조정하도록 해줄 것이라고 말했다. 또 새 자동화시스템으로 미국과 한국 지휘관들은 전투가 격화되는 상황에서 비밀리에 e-메일과 전투 자료들을 교환할 수 있게됐다고 이 신문은 전했다.

한편 USA 투데이는 한국 국방전문가가 한미 동맹은 이미 상호 신뢰를 잃었으며 미군 재배치는 매우 중대한 문제라고 말했다고 전했다. 또한 현재 진행되는 핵위기 속에서 (주한미군의) 변화를 발표하는 것에 대해 북한이 이것을 강점이 아닌 약점으로 해석할 우려가 있다고 이 신문은 덧붙였다. 


DMZ is a reminder of stakes in Korea crisis


By David J. Lynch, USA TODAY


PANMUNJOM, Korea — Stone-faced North Korean soldiers glare across a frosty no-man's land at their counterparts from South Korea. On a nearby hillside, enormous white characters spell out a propaganda tribute to the "Sunshine General," North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, and repeat the familiar, if futile, command: "Yankee, Go Home."


There's an air of menace and anachronism here in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), for half a century the dividing line between the two Koreas.

This buffer zone is a reminder of the stakes in the diplomatic maneuvering over North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Diplomats are laboring to arrange a new round of multilateral negotiations in Beijing. Even if they succeed, few here see much hope of soon squaring the North's demand for guarantees against an American attack with the Bush administration's insistence that Kim scrap his nuclear arms programs. "Their concept of a deal is not our concept of a deal. We've got a long way to go," says a Western diplomat monitoring the issue.

Clear violation of deal

The nuclear crisis erupted in October 2002 when the North Koreans admitted to a secret uranium enrichment program, a clear violation of a 1994 U.S.-North Korean agreement that barred Kim from developing nuclear weapons. The admission raised fears of a second Korean War and cemented Pyongyang's membership, alongside Iraq and Iran, in the Bush administration's "axis of evil." In September, China hosted talks aimed at reaching a new deal, but they made little progress. The North subsequently issued veiled threats to test one of the handful of nuclear devices the Central Intelligence Agency believes it already possesses.

As the diplomatic jockeying continues, armies on both sides of the 148-mile Korean divide gird for the all-but-unthinkable. Along Highway 1, which links the DMZ to the South Korean capital 30 miles south, camouflaged guard posts, floodlights and barbed wire line the seaward side to forestall waterborne incursions. Likewise, in the aftermath of the war in Iraq, Pyongyang watches for signs that Washington might pre-empt the threat from a second "axis" state.

The United States and its South Korean and Japanese allies earlier this month presented North Korea with the broad outline of an accord. But with little progress so far in bridging a gulf of mistrust between Pyongyang and Washington, talks originally expected to begin Dec. 17 now will slip into next year. "It won't be easy because North Korea is extremely suspicious of U.S. motives and intentions," warns Chung in Moon, an adviser to the South Korean government.

The alternative to an agreement would be nothing like the relatively painless initial combat victory over Iraq. If diplomacy fails, North Korean troops are expected to fight and fight hard. U.S. officers envision North Korea attacking in a sudden, violent lunge across the border. The aim would be a decisive defeat of U.S. and South Korean forces in fewer than 30 days, before reinforcements could arrive and North Korea's economic weakness hampers its military, officials said.

North Korean troops in recent years have leaned ever more forward, according to U.S. officials, though there have been no "significant changes" since the nuclear crisis erupted 15 months ago. Since 1981, North Korea has more than doubled the number of troops deployed between its capital, Pyongyang, and the DMZ roughly 100 miles away. Of its 1.2 million man military, 70% is stationed in that forward area.

"They are basically in their tactical assembly areas, so they don't have to have a big logistics buildup or a big movement of forces. They reside in areas that would allow them to immediately go into offensive operations," says Gen. Leon LaPorte, who commands U.S. troops here.

The United States and the 560,000-man South Korean army expect to detect any impending attack no more than two days before the first shot is fired.

Military feeling pinch

The Kim regime boasts hundreds of missiles, an arsenal of chemical weapons and about 88,000well-trained commandos, according to U.S. officials. Critical military assets, including artillery trained on Seoul, are secreted in underground sanctuaries. After decades of digging, North Korea is honeycombed with more than 11,000 tunnels, U.S. officials say.

North Korea devotes an estimated 34% of its paltry economic output to its military, the fourth-largest in the world, according to the Central Intelligence Agency. Despite this "military first" policy, the armed forces are feeling the pinch of a foundering economy. Over the past two years, North Korean forces have trained less often with fewer pieces of equipment than in previous years, LaPorte said.

"Most training has occurred in or near garrison, has involved small numbers of equipment and personnel, and has focused on improving basic proficiency skills," the U.S. Forces Korea command told USA TODAY in written responses to questions.

Likewise, much of Pyongyang's armor and aircraft is obsolete. The last new weapons systems Kim fielded, a 240mm multiple rocket launcher and a 170mm self-propelled artillery — appeared a decade ago. "The regime has been unable to modernize its aging conventional force," the command said.

Still, the United States isn't standing pat. The Pentagon plans to spend $11 billion over the next four years on improvements for forces based in South Korea and surrounding areas. The money would pay for new models of the Army's Apache attack helicopter; Patriot anti-missile systems; and precision-guided munitions like those used in Iraq.

Already, the United States has fielded new computer networks that would allow commanders to better coordinate movements between GIs and South Korean soldiers. A new automated system allows U.S. and South Korean commanders to exchange classified emails and battle data as combat rages.

One change aimed at boosting U.S. combat effectiveness has had mixed results. Last month, during a visit to Seoul, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said U.S. troops would "realign and consolidate" into new positions while shifting key defense tasks to South Korean troops. The plans to relocate about 15,000 U.S. soldiers from front-line positions near the DMZ to bases south of Seoul has left some South Korean defense analysts puzzling over American intentions.

The move is a shift from the traditional policy that viewed front-line U.S. units as a "tripwire" to be virtually sacrificed in the early days of a new war. Instead, the Pentagon wants to move beyond North Korean artillery range and rely on its own advanced stand-off weapons to counter any assault. Moving troops from bases in heavily developed urban areas also should reduce friction with the South Korean population, increasingly irked over intrusions by U.S. tanks and troops.

LaPorte insists that any reconfiguration of U.S. forces will boost allied combat power. But Taewoo Kim, a conservative defense expert with the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, speaks for many national security specialists here when he frets that the United States may be preparing to withdraw troops from Korea to employ in Iraq or Afghanistan. "The alliance is now losing mutual trust," Kim says. "The relocation is very serious. Probably the U.S. leadership has in mind how to reduce troops in South Korea."

There also are fears that announcing the change amid the ongoing nuclear crisis could signal weakness not strength to Kim. U.S. officials say Pyongyang shouldn't make that mistake. But they acknowledge they don't really know what the Kim regime thinks about many things.

Indeed, discerning North Korea's intentions and capabilities has been a vexing problem for decades. But in the past two years, North Korean military units have become more adept at thwarting U.S. intelligence collection efforts.

They have hidden an increasing amount of military hardware, including artillery, in tunnels and introduced advanced communications systems, using fiber optics or randomly switching between frequencies, that are more difficult to eavesdrop upon. "We have people we basically don't hear from anymore," says Shaun Darragh, a U.S. civilian intelligence analyst.

The quality of U.S. intelligence in the run-up to war in Iraq remains hotly debated. Now, as diplomacy here stalls, there is no certainty that the United States can accurately interpret North Korea's negotiating bluster or ascertain what is really happening inside the "hermit kingdom."

"Intelligence is problematic for us," LaPorte concedes. "It's a very closed society. Things we might know about another country, we don't know about North Korea."