안보뉴스 글씨확대글씨축소스크랩

"후세인 제거는 정당한 것"

Written by. 코나스   입력 : 2004-02-10 오후 4:29:11
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英 <이코노미스트>…"부시.블레어 과장은 했지만 거짓말은 하지않았다"

영국의 시사주간지 이코노미스트는 최신호에서 이라크에서 아직까지 대량살상무기가 발견되지 않았지만 후세인의 제거는 정당한 것이었다고 주장했다. 그 이유는, 전쟁전의 결정은 당시에 알려진 것만에 기초를 둘 수 밖에 없었고, 이라크는 자국이 대량살상무기를 포기했다는 증거를 보여주라는 유엔의 명령에도 불구하고 사실을 모호하게 했었으며, 후세인의 대량살상무기에 관련한 기록을 봤을때 의심이 충분히 되고도 남는다는 것이다.

이코노미스트는 그 증거로 유엔조사원들이 이라크에 대량살상무기가 없다고 확정짓지 못한 사실, 그리고 반전을 주장한 프랑스의 시라크 대통령조차도 이라크전쟁 한달전에 이라크가 대량살상무기를 갖고 있을 가능성이 높다고 말한 점을 지적했다.

이코노미스트는 또, 부시대통령과 블레어총리는 정당한 근거를 가지고 이라크가 금지된 무기들을 갖고 있다고 믿었다고 주장했다. 이코노미스트는 그 근거로 CIA 가 주전론자가 아닌 클린턴 당시 대통령에게도 같은 보고서를 올렸던 점, 그리고 정보부가 부시대통령이 임명되기 전과 9.11 테러로 인해 이라크문제가 대두되기 전에도 이미 동일한 결론에 도달하였다는 점을 지적했다. (제공 : 독립신문)

아래는 이코노미스트지에 실린 기사 원문이다.

BEFORE going to war against Saddam Hussein last March, George Bush and Tony Blair told the world they were certain that the Iraqi dictator possessed chemical and biological weapons, and long-range missiles, and was actively seeking an atomic bomb. This was the basis on which millions of Americans, Britons and others, including The Economist, supported the war. But ten months after the invasion, and despite the interrogation of hundreds of captured Iraqi officials, none of these weapons has been discovered. Even David Kay, the hardline inspector America had put in charge of the post-war weapons hunt, expects now that none will be (see article). After resigning from his job last week, he said that Iraq seemed to have got rid of them in the 1990s.

The absence of these weapons is more than just an embarrassment. It raises the question of whether this war was fought on a false prospectus. Above all, did the president of the United States and the British prime minister lie?

So far, the answer seems to be no. Not a scrap of evidence has emerged since the war to suggest that Mr Bush or Mr Blair doubted the truth of their central claim. Moreover, given the evidence available to them at the time, they were entitled to their pre-war confidence.


In October 2002, America´s National Intelligence Estimate concluded that Iraq had chemical and biological weapons and would probably have a nuclear weapon within the decade (or a year, if it got enough fissile material from abroad). Britain´s Joint Intelligence Committee reached similar conclusions. Though the BBC accused the British government of “sexing up” a dossier from this body, this week´s report by Lord Hutton clears the government. So did the MPs of the Intelligence and Security Committee, which compared the dossier with the raw intelligence from which it was derived.

Did the spies tell their political masters only what they wanted to hear? Perhaps. But the spies reached their conclusions long before the election of George W. Bush and September 11th put the invasion of Iraq back on the agenda. The CIA gave the same reports to Bill Clinton, not one of nature´s warmongers. Besides, the case against Iraq did not rest on intelligence alone. There was also the testimony of the UN inspectors: neither those forced to withdraw from Iraq in 1998, nor those who returned before last year´s war, could give Iraq a clean bill of health. And underlying the suspicion was the behaviour of Mr Hussein himself. If he had nothing to hide, why forgo billions of dollars of oil revenues instead of ending sanctions by showing the inspectors he had fully disarmed?

In short, the case for believing that Iraq had clung in defiance of the Security Council to its proscribed weapons was overwhelming. Even France´s Jacques Chirac, who opposed the war, referred a month before it to Iraq´s “probable” possession of them. This newspaper was blunter. However sceptical one might be about the intelligence, we said, “only a fool or a knave” would accept Mr Hussein´s plea of innocence: a country with Iraq´s record deserved no presumption of innocence.

So Messrs Bush and Blair seem to have believed, with good reason, that Iraq possessed proscribed weapons. What if, as now seems probable, they were nonetheless wrong? Then, as Mr Kay argues, there must have been a massive failure of intelligence. Though some of the spies continue to insist, like Mr Blair and America´s Vice-President Dick Cheney, that the illicit weapons or material will turn up in due time, Mr Bush himself has begun to wax less adamant. Intelligence cannot always be definitive. But Britain and America need to investigate what looks like a comprehensive spying failure that will haunt policymakers next time they are called on to deal with a rogue state believed to be building an atomic bomb.



Not fibbing, but stretching
Still, the politicians are not off the hook. Did president and prime minister, sincerely believing their central claim against Iraq, allow their conviction to distort the evidence they put before their people? It looks that way. Mr Bush conjured up a link between Iraq, al-Qaeda and September 11th that probably did not exist. He created an impression of a threat to the American homeland that the intelligence does not seem to justify. And when tabloid newspapers read Britain´s dossier to mean that Britons themselves could come under chemical attack within 45 minutes, Mr Blair did not trouble to put them right.

None of this exaggeration was necessary. The case for war rested on Iraq´s possession of proscribed weapons; Iraq seems to have got rid of them before the war began. But the pre-war decision could be based only on what was known at the time, and Iraq shrouded the true facts in ambiguity—despite the UN´s orders to prove that it had disarmed. Given Mr Hussein´s record, that should have been justification enough for war.
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