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Absracrt: How will North Korea(NK) react to the continuous combined pressures of international society, specifically United Nations(UN) Security Council to give up its nuclear weapons? Will the South-North Korea relations be worsened or a little improved under the brinkmanship of North Korea's nuclear tactics? Can North Korea survive this crucial era of economic globalization and economic interdependence among nations depending upon NK's such a hard-line tactics as its system survival strategy? Based upon these worries, assumptive elaborations and slim expectations, this short paper will focus upon the system survival dilemmas North Korea faces today as a huddle to inter-Korean ties, and on President Lee's bold "grand bargain approach" to solve the North Korea's nuclear issues as well as on the concrete measures to realize reconciliation between the two entities on the Korean Peninsula. NK's nuclear brinkmanship being the independent variable, promotion of inter-Korean ties as a dependent variable shall be dependent upon the prospect of this dangerous brinkmanship.
In a larger context, the lack of major trust among the four major countries unlike the case of European functional regionalism- the People's Republic of China( PRC), Japan, South Korea(SK), North Korea(NK) in Northeast Asian region, sometimes, creates more favorable ground for the NK's reckless nuclear brinkmanship, and further, deterring the sound development of inter-Korean relations. China factor is a strong determinant for improving inter-Korean ties in a affirmative way in the future. In Northeast Asia, nationalism still continues to take precedence in regional politics than relevant regimes, centering around the Korean Peninsula.
Pyongyang probably well understands the importance of its denuclearization willing and also in its process, SK's recently expanded role in the process along with the absolute role of the US. If NK continues to reduce the role of SK in the denuclearization process. It will be least helpful for NK to improve relations with the US, especially if pushed only through the NK-US bilateral framework. Pyongyang is required to be wise enough to put more weight to the trilateral framework of SK, the US and NK.
Our modest expectation and wish for NK to accept President Lee's "grand bargain approach" actually, if realized, could be a very positive start for initiating peaceful co-existence process on the Korean Peninsula. However, quite contrary to our modest wish, NK vowed on 1 October 2009, not to be bound by the latest United Nations resolution on non-proliferation and disarmament, saying it will never give up its nuclear weapons under any circumstance. This response is, as mentioned earlier, an indirect answer to President Lee's bold suggestion. NK is not following international society's united call for denuclearization, which is a big tragedy.
Even the situation remains unchanged in nature. SK should make more active efforts to change this deadlocked situation equipped with a firm belief that should more actively lead the future talks of peace-mechanism building on the Korean Peninsula apart from the immediate nuclear issue.
Key words: nuclear brinkmanship, Grand Bargain Approach, nuclear tactic, legitimation crisis, survival tactic, Denuclearization and Opening 3000, High Politics, Low Politics, co-existence, legitimacy crisis, the logic of normal state, selective engagement, mutual reciprocity
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